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Circuit Judges 
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OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires that we determine whether 
Denorris Mahone‟s conviction for making terroristic threats 
under § 2706 of Title 18 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code 
constitutes a “crime of violence” under United States 
Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1(a)(2).  We 
conclude, based on the record before us, that Mahone‟s 
conviction qualifies as a crime of violence.  For that reason, 
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we will affirm the judgment of the United States District 
Court. 
I. 
 Mahone pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession 
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  A 
probation officer prepared a presentence report, which 
determined that Mahone‟s base offense level under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(a)(2) was 24 because he had “at least two felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence [(COV)] or a 
controlled substance offense.”  Mahone objected.  He 
acknowledged that he had a prior conviction for a controlled 
substance offense.  But he asserted that his base offense level 
should have been only 20 because his 1994 conviction under 
Pennsylvania law for making terroristic threats in violation of 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706 did not qualify as a COV.   
Prior to sentencing, the District Court issued a 
memorandum order and tentative findings and rulings.  It 
concluded that Mahone‟s terroristic threats conviction 
qualified as a COV for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).  
Thereafter, it sentenced Mahone to a within-guideline 
sentence of 80 months of imprisonment, followed by a three 
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year term of supervised release.  This timely appeal 
followed.
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II. 
Mahone pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1).  Appendix A to the Sentencing Guidelines 
specifies that § 2K2.1 governs the computation of the offense 
level for § 922(g)(1) offenses.  Guideline 2K2.1(a)(2) 
provides that the base offense level is “24, if the defendant 
committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to 
sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a [COV] 
or a controlled substance offense[.]”  The Commentary to § 
2K2.1 instructs that COV “has the meaning given that term in 
§ 4B1.2(a) and Application Note 1” to that guideline.  
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.1.  Section 4B1.2 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines defines the term COV as, inter alia, “any offense . 
. . that - (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
                                              
1
   The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise plenary review of the 
District Court‟s determination that Mahone‟s conviction for 
making terroristic threats constituted a COV under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(a)(2).  United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another[.]”2  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).   
 In resolving the question of whether making terroristic 
threats in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706 satisfies the 
definition of COV in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), we must 
employ the “formal categorical approach” applied by the 
Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
1990).
3
  This approach mandates that we look “only to the 
                                              
2
   A prior conviction will not qualify as a COV under 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) unless it is a federal or state offense 
“punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).  That requirement is not in dispute here.  
 
3
   The definition of COV in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) is the 
same as the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i).  
The guidelines definition of COV in § 4B1.2(a)(1) is also the 
same as the definition of COV in 18 U.S.C. §§ 16(a) and § 
924(c)(3), except that those sections encompass crimes 
involving a use of force against the “property of another,” not 
just crimes against the person of another.  As a result, 
“authority interpreting one [of these other statutory 
provisions] is generally applied to the other[.]”  United States 
v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009); see also United 
States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(observing that the Supreme Court has treated the definitions 
of “violent felony” in the ACCA and “crime of violence” 
under the “Career Offender Guidelines” as “close enough that 
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statutory definition[] of the prior offense[], and not to the 
particular facts underlying” that conviction.  Id. at 600.  Our 
inquiry focuses on the “elements and the nature of the offense 
of conviction,” not the details of the crime actually 
committed.  Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004).   
The offense of making terroristic threats is set forth in 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706.  In 1994, when Mahone pleaded 
guilty to violating § 2706, the statute made it unlawful for a 
person to   
threaten[] to commit any crime of violence with 
intent to terrorize another or to cause evacuation 
of a building, place of assembly, or facility of 
public transportation, or otherwise to cause 
serious public inconvenience, or in reckless 
disregard of the risk of causing such terror or 
inconvenience. 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706 (1972).
4
   
                                                                                                     
precedent under the former must be considered in dealing 
with the latter”). 
  
4
  The federal sentencing guideline § 4B1.2(a)(1) and 
Pennsylvania statute 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706 both contain 
the term “crime of violence.”  We use the acronym COV to 
refer to the federal sentencing guideline enhancement.   In 
discussing the components of the Pennsylvania offense of 
making terroristic threats, we refer to “crime of violence”  
without abbreviation.   
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Like the offense of burglary in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
599, the statutory offense of making terroristic threats in § 
2706 is broader than the definition of COV in § 4B1.2(a)(1).  
Section 2706 encompasses some crimes that could be 
committed by using, attempting to use, or threatening to use 
“physical force against the person of another,” as well as 
against another person‟s property.  A property offense, 
however, does not qualify as a COV for purposes of the 
sentencing guidelines.  As a result, it cannot be said that the 
offense of making terroristic threats under § 2706 
categorically qualifies as a COV under § 4B1.2(a)(1).   
Our inquiry does not end at this point, however, for 
there are two exceptions to the formal categorical approach.  
In Singh v. Ashcroft, we explained that the first exception 
applies when the terms of the federal statute enumerating 
categories of crimes, which warrant application of the 
sentencing enhancement, “invite inquiry” into the 
circumstances surrounding the conviction at issue.  383 F.3d 
144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004); see Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 
2294, 2301 (2009) (recognizing that some statutes require 
application of a “circumstance specific approach”).  The 
second exception arises when the “statute of conviction” is 
“phrased in the disjunctive,” Singh, 383 F.3d at 162, and it is 
unclear “what elements formed the basis for a defendant‟s 
underlying conviction.”  Evanson v. Attorney Gen., 550 F.3d 
284, 291 (3d Cir. 2008).  “Statutes phrased in the disjunctive 
are akin to, and can be readily converted to, statutes 
structured in outline form, with a series of numbered or letter 
elements.”  Id.  The “disjunctive wording or outline 
formatting” presents either (1) separate subsections that 
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describe distinct offenses with distinct punishments, id., or (2) 
“alternate types of conduct” or “variations of the same 
offense, with no difference in punishment.”  Id.; see also 
Garcia v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 293 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
When the enumerating statute invites inquiry or the 
statute of conviction is phrased in the disjunctive, the 
sentencing court applies a modified approach, rather than the 
formal categorical approach.  Taylor, 474 U.S. at 602.  This 
modified approach permits a court to look “beyond the mere 
fact of conviction,” Taylor 495 U.S. at 602, in order to 
determine which statutory variation was the basis for the 
conviction.  Johnson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 
1265, 1273 (2010).  If the prior conviction was the result of a 
guilty plea, as it was in Mahone‟s case, this modified 
categorical approach allows the court  to examine the 
charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, or the 
transcript of a plea colloquy to determine whether a 
defendant‟s “plea of guilty [to an offense]. . . necessarily 
admitted elements” which constitute a COV under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(a)(1).  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 
(2005). 
In this case, the exception for disjunctive statutes of 
conviction applies.  In 1998, the Pennsylvania Legislature 
amended § 2706, placing the original definition of the offense 
of making terroristic threats in subsection (a) and adding 
subsections (b) and (c), which pertained to restitution and the 
preservation of private remedies.  Pub. L. 534, No. 76 § 1 
(June 18, 1998).  The following year, § 2706 was further 
amended by breaking the substantive description of the 
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offensive conduct in subsection (a) into numbered parts, i.e., 
an outline.  See Pub. L. 915, No. 59, § 2 (Dec. 15, 1999).  As 
amended, § 2706(a) provides: 
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the 
crime of terroristic threats if the person 
communicates, either directly or indirectly, a 
threat to: 
(1) commit any crime of violence 
with intent to terrorize another; 
(2) cause evacuation of a building, 
place of assembly or facility of 
public transportation; or 
(3) otherwise cause serious public 
inconvenience, or cause terror or 
serious public inconvenience with 
reckless disregard of the risk of 
causing such terror or 
inconvenience. 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a) (1999).  We conclude that the 
Pennsylvania Legislature‟s division of the 1972 statute into 
numbered sections in the 1999 amendment reflects that 
§ 2706 was divisible, describing three variations of the same 
offense.   
Because the version of § 2706 that existed in 1994 at 
the time of Mahone‟s conviction could be converted into an 
outline form, our “next step . . . is to determine whether a 
10 
 
violation of some of those sections, but not others, would 
constitute” a COV.  Joseph v. Attorney Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 
128 (3d Cir. 2006).  Viewed in outline form, it is only 
§ 2706(a)(1) which might qualify as a COV under federal law 
as it is the only variation that requires at a minimum the 
“threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another.”  See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (emphasis added); see 
also United States v. Ortiz-Gomez, 562 F.3d 683, 685 (5th 
Cir.
 
2009) (noting that it “is apparent from [the statute‟s] face 
that one or more of those offenses do not have as an element 
the . . . threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another”).  Parts (2) and (3) of subsection (a) of the 
Pennsylvania statute could be proven by establishing that 
there was a threat to use force against the property of another, 
as opposed to the “person of another.”  Furthermore, 
§ 2706(a)(1) is the only subpart that would always require a 
showing of intentional conduct as opposed to reckless or 
negligent conduct, which would be insufficient to establish 
the intent necessary for a COV.  See Singh v. Gonzales, 432 
F.3d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the “use of 
force” component for a COV under § 16(a), which is similar 
to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), “requires specific intent” and that 
“mere recklessness is insufficient”) (citing Tran v. Gonzales, 
414 F.3d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 2005)); United States v. Otero, 
502 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007) (reiterating that categorical 
crimes of violence require intentional conduct “against 
another rather than reckless or grossly negligent conduct”). 
We cannot conclude at this step in our analysis that the 
statutory variation in § 2706(a)(1) categorically qualifies as a 
COV under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) because this variation of 
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the statute contains the undefined term “crime of violence.”  
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1); see Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 
F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing that the 
“Pennsylvania Legislature has not defined the meaning of the 
term „crime of violence‟ as it is used in Section 2706”).5  
Because the state statute invites inquiry into the criminal 
offense Mahone threatened to commit, we must again apply 
the modified categorical approach to determine what was the 
underlying crime of violence.  Singh, 383 F.3d at 161.  
                                              
5
   We recognize that we determined in Bovkun that the crime 
of making terroristic threats in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2706 qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43) because it was a COV under 18 U.S.C. § 16.  
283 F.3d at 170.  There, we noted that § 2706, the state statute 
of conviction, had subsequently  been amended and 
subdivided into subsections (1) – (3).  283 F.3d at 169  n.4.  
This amendment did not change our analysis, we explained, 
because the  threat to commit a crime of violence had to be 
shown in every case.   
Bovkun is not controlling here as it preceded our 
decision in Singh, 383 F.3d at 162, which explained how to 
properly analyze a divisible statute.  Furthermore, the 
definition of COV in § 16 of the Federal Crimes Code 
includes not only offenses that have as an element the use of 
physical force against another person, but also against the 
property of another.  Thus, crimes of violence under § 16 
sweep more broadly than the COV definition in U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(a)(1).  Our analysis is limited to crimes involving the 
use of physical force against the person of another. 
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In Ortiz-Gomez, the Fifth Circuit considered whether 
the District Court erred by concluding that the defendant‟s 
prior conviction for making terroristic threats in violation of 
Pennsylvania‟s statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706, qualified as 
a COV.  562 F.3d at 683.  The Fifth Circuit determined that § 
2706(a)(1) was the basis for the defendant‟s conviction.  It 
recognized, however, that it had to look further to determine 
the predicate crime of violence that the defendant had 
threatened to commit.  562 F.3d at 685.  The charging 
document and the plea/sentence form, however, did not 
specify the predicate crime of violence that Ortiz-Gomez 
threatened to commit.  Because the term “crime of violence” 
in § 2706 was undefined, the Court considered a definition of 
this phrase set forth in another Pennsylvania criminal statute, 
which listed several “crimes of violence,” including arson.  
Id. at 685-86 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714(g)).  Because 
the offense of arson could be proven “regardless of whether a 
person is present,” the Court reasoned that arson does not 
have as an element the threatened use of physical force 
against a person, which is required for a COV under the 
sentencing guidelines.  Id. at 686.  Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that “a conviction for terroristic threats under 
section 2706(a)(1) that does not specify the predicate 
offense,” does not qualify as a COV under the sentencing 
guideline at issue.  Id.  Consistent with this conclusion, the 
Court vacated Ortiz-Gomez‟s sentence, which had been 
enhanced erroneously on the basis that his Pennsylvania state 
conviction for making terroristic threats under § 2706 was a 
COV, and remanded for resentencing.   
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Consistent with Shepard‟s instruction,  we consider the 
charging document and the guilty plea colloquy, 544 U.S. at 
26, to determine the “specific part of [§ 2706] to which 
[Mahone] in fact pled guilty,” United States v. Johnson, 587 
F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2009), and, if that part was subsection 
(a)(1), to ascertain whether there was any specification of the 
predicate crime of violence.  Unlike the charging documents 
in Ortiz-Gomez, which did not specify the predicate offense, 
Count 1 of Mahone‟s charging document stated:  “The actor 
threatened to commit the violent crime of criminal homicide 
with intent to terrorize D. Connolly in violation of Section 
2706 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 
1972, 18 PA. C. S. § 2706.”  The plea colloquy for this 
offense contains a factual recitation by the prosecutor, which 
indicates that D. Connolly was a Pittsburgh Police Officer 
who responded to a domestic dispute.  Mahone resisted arrest.  
Once subdued, he “threatened to kill the officers, specifically, 
Officer Connolly, when he got out of jail.”  The Court asked 
Mahone whether, having heard the evidence that was 
introduced against him, he was “pleading guilty because you 
are guilty?”   Mahone responded:  “Yes, I am.”   
These materials demonstrate that Mahone‟s guilty plea 
was to the variation of the statute codified in § 2706(a)(1), 
which, depending on the predicate offense, may constitute a 
COV under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).  Furthermore, Mahone‟s 
charging document specified that the predicate “crime of 
violence” was “criminal homicide,” which is defined in 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2501.  That statutory provision states that 
“[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, 
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knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of 
another human being.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
Citing the disjunctive nature of § 2501, Mahone 
contends that the offense of criminal homicide cannot qualify 
as a COV because it could be proven by either reckless or 
negligent conduct, neither of which would satisfy the mens 
rea required for a COV.  Superficially, this argument may 
seem to have some merit.  But we conclude that the only 
variations of the criminal homicide statute that could serve as 
the predicate crime of violence for purposes of § 2706 is the 
act of intentionally or knowingly causing the death of 
another.  This is so because a person cannot threaten to 
terrorize another with a reckless act.  See Knapik v. Ashcroft, 
384 F.3d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[a] person 
cannot intend to commit a criminally reckless act.  He or she 
either acts recklessly or does not.”).  Similarly, a person 
cannot threaten to terrorize another with subsequent negligent 
conduct.  See Otero, 502 F.3d at 335 (reiterating that a 
categorical COV requires intentional conduct and that grossly 
negligent conduct cannot be a basis for a COV).  In short, it is 
oxymoronic to suggest that one can intend to threaten another 
with an unintentional act.   
Having determined that neither recklessly nor 
negligently causing the death of another may constitute the 
predicate offense of criminal homicide necessary for a 
conviction for making terroristic threats under § 2706(a)(1), 
there remains one issue for our determination.  Does the 
predicate offense of criminal homicide by intentionally and 
knowingly causing the death of another have as an element 
the “use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force . . . 
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against the person of another” that is required for a COV 
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)?  In considering this, we find 
the Supreme Court‟s decision in Johnson instructive.  130 S. 
Ct. at 1265.  There, the Court had to determine  whether the 
mere intentional touching of another person, which would be 
sufficient to constitute a technical  battery under Florida state 
law, was a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA.  The 
Court declared that in the “context of a statutory definition of 
„violent felony,‟ the phrase „physical force‟ means violent 
force – that is, force capable of causing physical pain or 
injury to another person.”6  130 S. Ct. at 1271.  We conclude 
that threatening to use force that is capable of causing the 
death of another satisfies the “physical force” element 
necessary for a COV under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).   
To recap, application of the formal categorical 
approach demonstrated that the offense of making terroristic 
threats in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706 is broader 
than the definition of COV under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).  
Because § 2706 is phrased in the disjunctive, we applied the 
modified categorical approach, outlining § 2706 to determine 
if there was a variation that could constitute a COV.  We 
concluded that there may be such a variation if the conviction 
is threatening to commit a crime of violence with intent to 
terrorize another person.  We recognized, however, that a 
                                              
6
   As noted above, supra note 3, the ACCA definition of 
“violent felony” requires, like the guideline at issue here, that 
the conviction “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(i).   
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modified approach must also be employed to determine 
whether the underlying state crime of violence could satisfy 
the requirements for a federal COV.  Employing this 
modified approach to the predicate offense of criminal 
homicide in § 2501, we concluded that Mahone‟s charging 
document and his plea colloquy demonstrated that his 
conviction under § 2706 for threatening to commit criminal 
homicide constituted a COV under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) 
because it always “has as an element the . . . threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another[.]” 
For the above stated reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  
